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FEDERAL RIGHT JURISDICTION AND THE DECLARATORY
REMEDY
HERMAN L TRAUTMAN*
"The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves." F. W. Maitland"
"To be observant of these restrictions is not to indulge in formalism or
sterile technicality." Mr. Justice Frankfurter2
Why should we have federal district courts? What should be their
primary function?2 These questions are fundamental to the formula-
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. MAITLAND, THE Fo~ms OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (Chaytor and
Whittaker ed. 1948).
2. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673, 70 Sup. Ct.
876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
3. For a consideration of what they actually are doing see REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMNIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 49 et
seq. (1953); The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953).
There were 64,001 civil cases commenced in the United States district
courts during fiscal year 1953. Of these 23,881 were cases in which the United
States was a party, and 40,120 were private cases. Of the private cases, juris-
diction in 17,383 was based on diversity of citizenship, an increase of more
than 14 per cent over the year before; in 8,982 jurisdiction was based upon a
"federal question"; 3,223 were cases in admiralty; and 10,532 were cases of
general local jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canal Zone,
Guam and Virgin Islands. Of the "federal question" cases, jurisdiction in al-
most all seems to depend upon one of the federal specialties---28 U.S.C. §§
1333-1358-with personal injuries to seamen under the Jones Act leading at
2,463, personal injuries to railroad employees at 1,319, habeas corpus 549, patent
562, rent control 500, and banks and banking 1,369 being the leaders. There
does not seem to be any separate breakdown for cases in which jurisdiction
depends solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The total number of cases classified as
"all other" is 150. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 148-49, Table C 2 (1953).
The Harvard Law Review survey at p. 170 shows that during the term
the Supreme Court disposed of 475 cases which came from state courts. Of
these, only 59 cases were decided on the merits, and 416 were disposed of on
certiorari petition.
With this data compare (1) a statement by Chief Justice Taft on the
function of the Supreme Court; and (2) a statement by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter on the considerations which move the court in granting or refusing
certiorari:
(1) "The function of the Supreme Court is conceived to be, not the
remedying of a party litigant's wrong, but the consideration of cases
whose decision involves principles, the application of which are of
wide public or governmental interest and which should be authorita-
tively declared by the final court." Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court under The Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1925).
(2) "Petitions may have been denied because, even though serious
constitutional questions were raised, it seemed to at least six mem-
bers of the Court that the issue was either not ripe enough or too
moribund for adjudication; that the question had better await the
perspective of time or that time would soon bury the question or, for
one reason or another, it was desirable to wait and see.... Divergent
and contradictory reasons often operate as to the same petition and
lead to a common vote of denial. The want of explanations for denials
445
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tion of a rational basis for the distribution of judicial power between
state courts and the trial courts of the federal government.
Our American federal system seeks as a constant objective an
appropriate division of governmental power between a national unit,
which deals with problems requiring uniform treatment, and state
units, which have responsibility for problems depending more upon
local conditions. Applying the principle to the federal district courts,
it seems clear that their primary function should be to adjudicate
federal substantive rights and duties. It is a paradox in American
federalism that under existing rules for determining jurisdiction
between the courts of the two units of government many of our most
cherished federal rights under the Constitution and other federal
laws cannot be adjudicated in the federal trial courts. State courts
are regularly employed for the enforcement of federal substantive
rights and duties having no "necessary connection" with state sub-
stantive law, while federal courts are employed in diversity cases
for the enforcement of state substantive rights and duties having no
"necessary connection" with federal substantive law.4 Since federal
and state courts maintain separate systems of procedure and separate
remedial concepts, there is added to the burden of distinguishing
between federal and state substantive rights, the problem of disen-
tangling federal and state remedies and procedures. There seems in-
deed to be a real need for general re-evaluation of the types of cases
which federal district courts ought to determine, with appropriate
recommendations to the Congress.
of certiorari is in part due to the fact that a collective reason fre-
quently could not be given." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 227, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950). See
also Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-19,
70 Sup. Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562 (1950); Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340
U.S. 844, 71 Sup. Ct. 9, 95 L. Ed. 619 (1950).
4. See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COL. L. Rav.
489, 498 (1954). Consider (1) the present rule of general federal question
jurisdiction as developed by Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 9 Sup. Ct.
173, 32 L. Ed. 543 (1888); Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U.S.
454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed. 511 (1894); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 29 Sup. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908); (2) the rule that
state courts can be compelled to take jurisdiction of newly created federal
rights of action, Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 Sup. Ct. 810, 91 L. Ed. 967
(1947); and (3) the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup.
Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) to be applied in the determination of non-federal
issues in the federal courts. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 Sup.
Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 832 (1947); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208,
60 Sup. Ct. 201, 84 L. Ed. 196 (1939); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63
Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528
(1949).
5. See Hart, supra note 4; Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play
on the Federal Rules, 3 VA-D. L. REV. 711 (1950); Gavit, States' Rights and
Federal Procedure, 25 IxD. L. J. 1 (1949).
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Considerable attention has been given in recent years to the federal
question jurisdiction of the district courts., This valuable research
has stressed in the main the difference between the interpretation
given by the Supreme Court to the words "arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made" in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution, and the almost identical words in the
Act of Congress of March 3, 1875,7 and its subsequent amendments.
There is apparent in these writings a very considerable disagreement
both with respect to what the present rule is and what it ought to be.
The principal emphasis of this paper will be to show that the present
rules of general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts
depends for its application upon the uncertainties implicit in an
analysis of modern fact situations in terms of common law and equity
forms of action and pleading, rather than the adjudication of federal
substantive rights and duties; to consider critically whether such a
rule based upon the formalistic detail of remedies and pleading will
tolerate a new twentieth century remedy-the declaratory judgment
remedy-because of the latter's capacity for presenting the actual
issues in the case at an earlier stage in the pleading; and to suggest
possible avenues of reform.
I.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT RULE
(a) The Term "Federal Question" Jurisdiction:
6. For historical background and interpretation of the statutory grant
of jurisdiction see, Willard, When Does a Case "Arise" under Federal Laws?
45 Am. L. REV. 373 (1911); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question,"
16 TULANE L. REv. 362 (1942); Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of
Federal Questions, 90 U. or PA. L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, Federal Question
Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TULANE L. REV. 263 (1943); Bergman, Reap-
praisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MicH. L. Rv. 17 (1947); Fraser,
Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MicH. L. Rv. 73 (1950);
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. REv. 157
(1953). See also, Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor
Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1948); and Wechsler, Federal Juris-
diction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216,
223-234 (1948). There have also been several excellent student notes.
7. C. 137 § 1, 18 STAT. 470; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, c. 373 § 1, 24 STAT. 552; Act
of Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 STAT. 433; Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 24, 36
STAT. 1091, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1947). This section appears in the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code as 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1949).
8. The present rule is summarized in Gully v. First National Bank in
Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 Sup. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936) as follows:
"To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an es-
sential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action .... The right or inunity must
be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United
States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive
another... A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or
conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto, . . . and the controversy
must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or
by the petition for removal.... Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as
a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's
cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable defense."
19541
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The phrase federal question jurisdiction as applied to trial courts
is ambiguous. When applied to the appellate review jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court, it seems quite clear because the
case has been tried and the record made up, so that the only basis
for such a review is to decide questions of law raised in the record.
But jurisdiction in the trial court, unlike appellate jurisdiction, is
necessarily jurisdiction to decide whole cases, not merely questions
in cases. Such jurisdiction requires power to determine both issues of
law and issues of fact.
In Cohens v. Virginia9 the Supreme Court established its juris-
diction under the "arising under" clause of the Constitution to exer-
cise appellate review over questions of federal law appearing in the
record of a case tried and decided by a Virginia state court. Chief
Justice Marshall said:
"A case.. . may truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of
the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construc-
tion of either."' 0
It is clear that the only issues at that stage of the proceeding
were issues of law. In the Osborn" case the Court held that Congress
had the power to grant jurisdiction to federal trial courts over whole
cases in which a federal law was only an "ingredient," even though
only issues of fact concerning non-federal rights were involved. But
in the course of the opinion Chief Justice Marshall repeated in sub-
stance the words set forth above He said:
"If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set
up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution
or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction,
... then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which
gives that jurisdiction."'12
In 1877 when the Court in the Gold-Washing3 case was called upon
for the first time to consider the new statutory grant to the trial courts
of jurisdiction generally to determine cases "arising under" federal
laws, the language of Marshall construing the Constitution was re-
peated:
"In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, a case 'may truly be said to
arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States whenever its
correct decision depends upon the construction of either' (Cohens v. Vir-
9. 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (U.S. 1821).
10. Id. at 379.
11. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S.
1824).
12. Id. at 822.
13. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 24 L. Ed. 656 (1877).
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ginia, . . .); or when 'the title or right set up by the party may be de-
feated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United States,
or sustained by the opposite construction' (Osborne [sic] v. Bank .... ).14
Thus language descriptive only of an issue of law in a case involving
only appellate review was transplanted as an element in the statu-
tory grant of trial court jurisdiction. It has been repeated year after
year to the present day and fits about as well as the traditional square
peg in a round hole. Clearly it is not a constitutional limitation, else
Marshall in the Osborn case would be overruled and the dissent of
Mr. Justice Johnson adopted, and many acts of Congress granting
jurisdiction in cases depending wholly on fact issues in such federal
specialties as bankruptcy, patents, taxes and labor would be uncon-
stitutional.15 Since it is also clear that the courts pay no attention
to it in the federal specialties, 16 if it means anything at all, it can
only be that in cases where jurisdiction is based on the general
federal right section-28 U.S.C.A. § 1331-the district courts do not
have jurisdiction unless there is an issue of federal law raised in
the case; whereas if jurisdiction is based on one of the federal specialtr
sections-e.g. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1333-1358--it exists if there is either an
issue of fact or an issue of law.17
While it is believed that this distinction between the sections of
the statute using substantially the same words is neither desirable
nor rational, a search of the cases will compel the conclusion that
it is a point of considerable uncertainty and difference of opinion in
the court decisions' s as well as among commentators."9 Certainly
14. Id. at 201.
15. See e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334-1359 (1950). Litigation concerning the
Employers Liability Act, the Jones Act, patents, civil rights, and taxes
frequently depend solely on issues of fact.
16. See McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. 998 (D.N.Dak. 1913), cited
with approval many times by the Supreme Court.
17. See Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1950), where Judge
Mars says: "For cases arising under the Constitution within the meaning of
Article III, Section 2, and of Section 1331 which implements it, are only such
cases as really and substantially involve a controversy as to the effect or
construction of the Constitution upon the determination of which the result
depends." Cf. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 845 (1st Cir. 1952), where
Chief Judge Magruder says: "Furthermore, it cannot be that the jurisdiction
of a district court under § 1331 depends upon whether the case develops into
a controversy on an issue of law as to the construction of the Constitution
or a law of the United States. When a complaint is filed it cannot be known
whether the defendant is going to raise any such issue; he may concede that
a cause of action is well pleaded, and merely raise issues of fact by denial
of the allegations of the complaint."
18. Cf. Jordine v. Walling and Doucette v. Vincent supra note 17. See also
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 509, 20 Sup. Ct. 726, 44 L. Ed.
864 (1900) where the Court said: "Inasmuch, therefore, as the 'adverse suit'
to determine the right of possession may not involve any question as to the
construction or effect of the Constitution or laws of the United States, but
may present simply a question of fact... it would seem to follow that it is
not one which necessarily arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States." [Italics supplied] Cf. McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., supra note 16,
1954 ]
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the power of the district courts to act in the area defined by statute
ought to extend to issues of fact as well as to issues of law. Because
the phrase "federal question jurisdiction" implies only a question of
law as is true in appellate review jurisdiction, it is believed that a
phrase more descriptive of the power of the district courts to act in
this area would be the phrase federal right jurisdiction.
(b) The Constitution and the Statute:
The scope of the judicial power of the United States under the
Constitution in cases "arising under" federal law as authorized in
Article III, Section 2, was given a very broad interpretation in the
Osborn case. "This clause enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution... ,,21 When a
federal law forms an ingredient, Congress may give the trial courts
jurisdiction, although other questions of fact or of law may be in-
volved in it. Indeed, there need be no issue either of fact or law in
regard to the federal ingredient. Thus it was held that the mere fact
of the federal incorporation of the Bank of the United States was
a sufficient federal ingredient to make any case in which it was a
party-even though the only issue might be one of tort, contract,
property or anything else-a case "arising under" federal law within
the judicial power of the United States. There was thus established
the basic principle discussed in the conventions on the Constitution
that "if there were any political axiom under the sun, it must be,
that the judicial power ought to be co-extensive with the legislative.
" . .- 22 Pursuant to the principle, Congress has granted special juris-
a federal specialty case which has been cited approvingly many times by the
Supreme Court in cases where jurisdiction was based on the general statute,
§ 1331. "It cannot be that the jurisdiction of a suit originally brought in the
District Court, or removed thereto, on the ground that it arises under the
federal Constitution or law, must depend upon whether in the actual trial
of the case a controversy will arise as to the effect or construction of the
federal Constitution or law. . . . But when the complaint asserts a right
created by federal law, it presents a suit which may properly turn upon a
construction of that law; and such a suit 'arises out of' the law for purposes
of federal jurisdiction, notwithstanding the defendant may raise only issues
of fact (italics supplied] by his answer." Id. at 1001, 1005. See also, Note, 12
A.L.R. 2d 5, 28 (1950) and cases cited in n. 20 (1950).
19. Compare HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEm 763 (1953): "The problem of jurisdiction when the controversy in
such a case relates solely to questions of fact has bemused some commentators
but few courts," citing only the McGoon case, supra note 16; and Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. REV. 157, 170 (1953)
concluding as "the only possible inference" that "the demand for a 'genuine
controversy' about federal law is not" required; with Chadbourn and Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. OF PA. L. R1v. 639 (1942),
and Note, Proposed Revision of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 40 ILL. L. Rnv.
387 (1945).
20. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S.
1824).
21. Id. at 819.
22. 4 ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNvENTxONs ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrruTION 158 (2d ed. 1836); and see 3 Id. at 532.
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diction to the district courts in many types of cases in which the actual
issues are of such common law types as negligence and other torts
generally, contracts, and property,23 in which the federal ingredient
is not in issue and indeed is quite remote.
When, however, the first statute that granted jurisdiction generally
to the federal trial courts in cases "arising under" federal laws-the
Act of 1875 24-- was brought before the Supreme Court in the Gold-
Washing23 case, the narrow interpretation of Mr. Justice Johnson's
dissent on the constitutional construction in the Osborn case was
adopted as a proper interpretation of the statute. In order to be
within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, the case must be capable
of being decided on federal issues,2 6 and indeed, the interpretation of
the statute may have been even narrower than Justice Johnson's
view insofar as the Court may be considered to have held that trial
court jurisdiction exists only if there is a substantial issue of law.27
This narrow interpretation of the statute continues to the present
day.28 Thus it was established at the outset that under the statute
In his dissent Mr. Justice Johnson thought that the scope of the judicial
power of the United States under the Constitution should be limited to cases
in which one of the issues litigated was a federal issue.
23. Contract and tort rights and duties in labor relations are the subjects of
Sections 301 and 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1953); issues of negligence are the most frequent in ac-
tions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1943), and
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1944); issues of property and fraud are
frequently involved in administration of the Bankruptcy Act, particularly
plenary actions between the trustee and adverse claimants. See §§ 2a (6), (7),
and § 23 of the Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ Ila (6), (7), and § 46 (Supp. 1953). See
also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1333-1358 (1949) for other instances of special federal
question jurisdiction.
24. See note 7 supra. The Federalist statute of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 STAT.
89, 92 is excepted. It was repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 STAT. 132.
25. Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 24 L. Ed. 656 (1877).
26. "The suit must, in part at least, arise out of a controversy between the
parties in regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon
the facts involved." Id. at 203.
27. "Before, therefore, a circuit court can be required to retain a cause
under the jurisdiction, it must in some form appear upon the record, by
a statement of facts, 'in legal and logical form,' such as is required in good
pleading (1 Chit. P1. 213), that the suit is one which 'really and substantially
involves a dispute or controversy' as to a right which depends upon the
construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United
States." Id. at 203-04.
While Mr. Justice Johnson is not explicit about questions of fact as well
as questions of law, his words were: "[T]hey contended, that until a question
involving the construction or administration of the laws of the United States
did actually arise, the casus federis was not presented.... And this doctrine
has my hearty concurrence in its general application." Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 885, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S. 1824).
28. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 57 Sup. Ct. 96,
81 L. Ed. 70 (1936); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667,
70 Sup. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950); Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st
Cir. 1952).
The proof submitted by Dean Forrester that Congress intended in the Act
of 1875 to grant to the trial courts the full scope of the jurisdiction authorized
by the Constitution seems direct and persuasive.,See 16 TuLAm L. REV. 362,
1954]
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the basic test of jurisdiction was whether or not a federal substantive
right is actually an issue in the case.9 Jurisdiction was not limited
to cases where the federal right could be made to appear in the
plaintiff's complaint. The only test was whether there was a federal
issue which was determinative of the case.
Even the often criticized Gold-Washing case held that if it appeared
from "the record, by a statement of facts"8°--not just the plaintiff's
complaint-that the suit really involved a controversy between the
parties "as to a right which depends"3 1 on federal law, there would
be jurisdiction.
In Tennessee v. Davis the Court said:
"Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out
of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or
privilege, or claim or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in
part, by whom they are asserted." [Italics supplied]32
In Albright v. Teas the Court said:
"It is clear, from an inspection of the bill and answers, that the case is
founded. . . ." [Italics supplied]
33
In Starin v. New York the Court said:
"The character of a case is determined by the questions involved.... The
questions in this case, as shown by the pleadings, are .... " [Italics sup-
plied]34
375 et seq. (1942). Also see, In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 659, 14 Sup. Ct. 221,
37 L. Ed. 1211 (1893). But Professors Hart and Wechsler ask whether the
practically synonymous language in the Constitution and the statute plus the
proof of Congressional intent offered by Dean Forrester are nevertheless
"sufficient justification for disregarding the manifest differences in the func-
tions of the provisions?" HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEm 750 (1953). No doubt, the effect of such a broad grant of statu-
tory jurisdiction would have overwhelmed the dockets of the federal trial
courts with cases turning wholly upon state law issues, so long as there was a
federal "ingredient" however remote. But if Congress intended what Senator
Carpenter said it did, the Supreme Court's decision in the Gold-Washing
case would seem to be a usurpation of the admitted power of Congress to
control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
29. Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 24 L. Ed. 656 (1877);
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264, 25 L. Ed. 648 (1879); Feibelman v.
Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 3 Sup. Ct. 289, 27 L. Ed. 984 (1883); Starin v. New
York, 115 U.S. 248, 6 Sup Ct. 28, 29 L. Ed. 388 (1885). See also Swafford v.
Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 22 Sup. Ct. 783, 46 L. Ed. 1005 (1902); The Fair v.
Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 33 Sup. Ct. 410, 57 L. Ed. 716 (1913);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 Sup. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).
30. Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203, 24 L. Ed.
656 (1877).
31. Ibid.
32. 100 U.S. 257, 264, 25 L. Ed. 648 (1879).
33. 106 U.S. 613, 616, 1 Sup. Ct. 550, 27 L. Ed. 295 (1882).
34. 115 U.S. 248, 257, 6 Sup. Ct. 28, 29 L. Ed. 388 (1885).
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In Feibelman v. Packard the Court said:
"for if we look at the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and the
grounds of the defence ... it is apparent that the suit arose under a law of
the United States." [Italics supplied] 35
In Robinson v. Anderson the Court said:
"The Circuit Court cannot be required to keep jurisdiction of a suit...
if, when the pleadings are all in, it appears that these averments are im-
material in the determination of the matter really in dispute. " [Italics
supplied]30
Thus there was established a parallel in jurisdiction between the
federal trial courts and the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate
review in state court cases "arising under" the federal law.3 7 In
neither case would jurisdiction exist under the respeotive statutes
of Congress unless in fact there was a federal substantive right
actually in issue in the case, and the outcome of the whole case would
be controlled by the decision on this issue.38 The essential difference
in the function of the Supreme Court and the trial courts is of course
basic: the Supreme Court would decide only questions of federal law
upon which the entire case depends; while the trial courts would
adjudicate whole cases. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Act
of 1875, passed some two months after the decision in Murdock v.
City of Memphis," was a reaction to the Supreme Court's refusal
in that case to decide all of the issues-state and federal-when
there exists a federal issue sufficient for appellate review of the
case." It was feared that federal questions might be buried in state
court records. 41 Therefore, it is said that the Act of March 3, 1875,42
granting jurisdiction over federal issues generally to the federal trial
courts, would enable them to decide whole cases, and the Supreme
Court would thus be enabled to review matters which the Murdock
35. 109 U.s. 421, 423, 3 Sup. Ct. 289, 27 L. Ed. 984 (1883).
36. 121 U.S. 522, 524, 7 Sup. Ct. 1011, 30 L. Ed. 1021 (1887).
37. The modern version of the famous Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (1949). The modern version of the Act of 1875
which granted jurisdiction to federal trial courts in cases arising under federal
laws generally is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1949). See note 7 supra.
38. With respect to the limitations on appellate review by the Supreme Court
see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 22 L. Ed. 429 (1874); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 65 Sup. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. 789 (1945). See, generally,
ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 89-112 (Wolfson and Kurland ed. 1951); Weisberg, Supreme
Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving Multiple Questions, 95 U.
oF PA. L. REV. 764 (1947); Note, Supreme Court Disposition of State Decisions
Involving Non-Federal Questions, 49 YALE L.J. 1463 (1940).
39. 20 Wall. 590, 22 L. Ed. 429 (U.S.- 1875).
40. See Weisberg, supra note 38 at 766. It was feared that federal questions
might be buried deep in state court records. Id. at 765.
41. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 605, 22 L. Ed. 429 (1874).
42. Note 7 supra.
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case had eliminated on appellate review of state court cases.4 3 In
either event the basis of federal court jurisdiction was the same-
(1) there must be a federal substantive right in issue in the case;
(2) the outcome of the case must be controlled by it; and (3) the
court will look to the entire record to find it.
It is the position of this paper that this was a rational and sensible
basis for determining the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts, and
that it afforded adequate protection against the possibility that the
dockets of federal courts might be turned into "a vast current of
litigation indubitably arising under State law."44 Instead, with appro-
priate regard for the functional differences between trial and appellate
courts, both the district courts and the Supreme Court would have
been available to perform their primary function-the vindication of
federal rights.
II.
THE PRESENT RULE AND FoRIs oF AcTIoN
The federal right test of trial court jurisdiction discussed above
was muddled considerably by three later cases beginning in 1888 with
Metcalf v. Watertown;45 Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank46 in
1894; and Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley41 in 1908. In these
three cases the Court took upon itself, without any real proof of
Congressional approval, the function of reducing the jurisdiction of
the federal trial courts so that it was much narrower than the parallel
scope of appellate jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court over
state decisions.
In Metcalf v. Watertown," the plaintiff brought suit in the federal
circuit court as an assignee to recover on a judgment of a federal
court. The defendant City answered setting up the Wisconsin ten-year
statute of limitations. Since the Wisconsin statute prescribed a limi-
tations period of ten years for actions on judgments of courts of other
states and courts of the United States, while a twenty-year period of
limitations was allowed for actions on judgments of Wisconsin courts,
the plaintiff contended that the state statute violated the federal
43. Weisberg, supra note 38. Except for the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 STAT.
89, 92, passed by the Federalists, which was repealed by the Act of March 8,
1802, 2 STAT. 132, Congress did not confer upon the trial courts jurisdiction
over federal issues generally until 1875. Even then a minimum jurisdictional
amount was required. However Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1
STAT. 73, gave the Supreme Court the power of appellate review over federal
questions in cases decided by state courts when the claim of federal right
was denied.
44. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667, 673, 70 Sup. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
45. 128 U.S. 586, 9 Sup. Ct. 173, 32 L. Ed. 543 (1888).
46. 152 U.S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed. 511 (1894).
47. 211 U.S. 149, 29 Sup. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908).
48. Note 45 supra.
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Constitution. The case "was argued entirely" below on this federal
issue. The Supreme Court held that it did not have to decide the
federal issue at this time because the lower court was without juris-
diction. The Court drew a distinction between cases filed originally
in the federal trial courts and cases removed there from state tribunals.
Jurisdiction must appear at the outset when it is invoked in either
instance. In the former, it must appear "from the declaration or the
bill of the party suing," whereas in removal cases the federal sub-
stantive right could appear in the record for the first time in the
answer, plea, or petition and affidavit of removal. In an action filed
originally, if the plaintiff's initial pleading did not show a federal
substantive right, the court could not wait to see whether such rights
were actually in issue in the case under a general allegation, as in
diversity of citizenship cases; the case would have to be dismissed
because under the rules of common law pleading the federal issue
would not be presented until the plaintiff's reply in avoidance of the
defendant's answer setting up the Wisconsin ten-year statute of
limitation as a defense.
In Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bankc,49 the State asserted a tax
on the shares of stock of the Bank. The Bank contended that since
its corporate charter prescribed an annual capital stock tax "in lieu of
all other taxes" the tax now asserted violated the impairment of
contract clause of the federal Constitution. Thus the only issue was
a federal issue. Actually, there were three cases, two of which were
filed by the State against Union and Planters' Bank and Bank of
Commerce in the federal circuit court, and the third filed by the
State against Bank of Commerce in the state court, and removed
by the Bank to the federal court. In the cases filed originally in the
federal court the State's action was a bill in equity setting forth the
tax asserted and the Bank's contention of federal immunity under
the Constitution, and praying for an order deciding the issue. In the
removed case the Bank's claim of federal immunity appeared in the
petition for removal. In this case the Court was also confronted with
a revision of the Act of 1875, passed in 1887,50 which was corrected by
the Act of August 13, 1888. 51 In the revision Congress pared down
federal trial court jurisdiction by raising the jurisdictional amount
from $500 to $2,000, eliminating removal by plaintiffs, and making
orders of remand to the state courts non-appealable. Prior to this
time Congress had begun the process of reducing jurisdiction based
solely on federal incorporation.5
2
The majority opinion disposes of the two cases filed originally in
49. Note 46 supra.
50. 24 STAT. 552 (1887).
51. 25 STAT. 433 (1888).
52. Act of July 12, 1882, 22 STAT. 163.
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the federal court on the authority of the Metcalf case. Despite the
fact that the only issue in the case was a federal issue of rights
under the Constitution, the Court found it unnecessary to decide
them. The statement of the federal right and the federal issue which
was alleged in the plaintiff's bill was held to be anticipatory pleading.
"In each of the three cases now before this court, the only right
claimed by the plaintiffs is under the law of Tennessee. '5 3 In the
third case, which was removed from the state tribunal, the Court
found that the distinction made in Metcalf was no longer valid. A
federal substantive right asserted as a defense could not be vindicated
in a federal trial court by removal; only those federal substantive
rights which belonged to the plaintiff could be presented to the
federal trial courts; and then only if they were essential allegations
of the plaintiff's initial pleading, measured in terms of common law
and equity forms of action. Authority for this discrimination against
the federal rights of defendants was based on Section 2 of the Act
of 1887 which provided that those civil suits "arising under" federal
laws "of which the Circuit Courts of the United States are given
original jurisdiction by the preceding section" may be removed. The
Court argued that since the Metcalf case had construed the preceding
section under the 1875 Act to grant jurisdiction in original actions
only when the plaintiff's initial pleading alleged a federal right, the
quoted words above in the 1887 Act limited removal jurisdiction in
the same way. Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion in Metcalf,
dissented in regard to the removed case, arguing that the words quoted
above referred solely to the increased jurisdictional amount required
in the Act of 1887. He forcefully asserted that the majority opinion
discriminates unfairly against the defendant whose defense "is
grounded entirely" upon federal law.
Suppose, instead of being so accommodating, the state tax collector
had seized or threatened to seize the property of the bank in each
instance, or placed a cloud on its title? If the bank had filed the
suit in the federal court to enjoin the state tax collector from invading
its alleged federal immunity from the tax, there is no doubt that
there would be jurisdiction under the new test laid down by the
Metcalf and the Union and Planters' Bank cases.5
Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley"5 was a suit by a husband
and wife filed in the federal trial court to compel the specific perform-
ance of a contract in which the railroad agreed for a valid considera-
tion to issue free passes during the lives of the plaintiffs. It was
53. 152 U.S. 454, 464, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed. 511 (1894).
54. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243,
65 L. Ed. 577 (1921); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 Sup. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed.
939 (1946).
55. 211 U.S. 149, 29 Sup. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908).
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alleged that the Company had issued the passes until 1907, and then
refused to do so because of an act of Congress in 1906 which pro-
hibited "free passes." The plaintiffs' bill alleged that the Act of
Congress did not apply to plaintiffs' contract for passes, and if it
did, it violated the Fifth Amendment. The lower court took jurisdic-
tion and decided for the plaintiffs. While neither party questioned
jurisdiction, and the only issue involved was the federal issue, the
Supreme Court of its own motion reversed and directed dismissal:
"It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to
his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some
provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allega-
tions show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under
the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the
plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution." [Italics
suppliedJ6
Thus the Court abandoned the parallel in jurisdiction between
the federal trial courts and Supreme Court review of state court
decisions on federal right issues. Instead the jurisdiction of the
district courts is placed upon the narrower esoteric uncertainties
implicit in the forms of action and pleading. It is no longer sufficient
that the outcome of the entire case depends upon the adjudication
of an issue concerning a federally created substantive right. The
more important test now is whether the assertion of the federal right
is an essential allegation of the plaintiff's initial pleading when meas-
ured by the forms of remedies. This was the technique used by the
1888-94 Supreme Court to restrict narrowly the general federal right
jurisdiction of the federal trial courts created by Congress in 1875.
No doubt it was felt that many federal right cases would thus get
lost in the state courts and that this would balance to some extent
the large influx of non-federal right litigation in the federal courts,
which the Supreme Court itself had gone far to assure.
57
Equitable remedies stand a better chance of establishing jurisdic-
tion than do common-law forms of action,58 because the pleading forms
in equity were inherently verbose. But alas, there are distinctions
drawn between even equitable remedies. The essential allegations
of a suit to remove a cloud on the plaintiff's title are considered
sufficiently broad to include the federal substantive right involved. 59
In an action to quiet title, however, "it is not necessary for the plaintiff
to do more than allege his own title and that the defendant claims
56. Id. at 152.
57. See note 67 infra.
58. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 34 Sup. Ct. 724, 58 L. Ed. 1218 (1914);
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L.
Ed. 577 (1921).
59. Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 37 Sup. Ct. 711, 61 L. Ed. 1270 (1917).
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adversely to him;" therefore notwithstanding the fact that the plain-
tiff alleged a federal substantive right with the good faith required
in Bell v. Hood0° and The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 1 it will
be regarded as "immaterial" when measured by the pleading rules for
an action to quiet title.62
In White v. Sparkill Realty Corp. 3 the plaintiff, out of possession,
brought a suit in equity to enjoin the defendants from continuing
in possession of his land, which they as members of the New York
Board of Commissioners had taken for a state park pursuant to certain
state statutes. Plaintiff asserted that the acts of the board and state
officers, and the statutes under which they proceeded were invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the federal
Constitution. First the Court analyzed the plaintiff's complaint in
terms of remedies and decided that since plaintiff was out of posses-
sion, the proper remedy was ejectment; and when only the essential
allegations of an action in ejectment are considered, plaintiff's asser-
tion of a federal substantive right under the Constitution is antici-
patory. There was no regard at all for the fact that the only real
issue in the case was over a federal substantive right. While the
complaint was well pleaded as a suit in equity and as such presented
the federal right involved, when measured in terms of a declaration
in ejectment, the allegation of the federal right was anticipatory of
that which is set forth in a reply to the defendant's answer.
In Campbell v. Chase Nat. Bank64 plaintiff had delivered gold
bullion to the defendant bank for safe-keeping. The President of
the United States had issued an executive order pursuant to an act
of Congress which prohibited the purchase or hoarding of gold. The
bank notified plaintiff that pursuant to the executive order, it would
surrender the bullion to the Government. The plaintiff demanded
delivery of the gold to him, which was refused, whereupon he sued
the bank in the federal court to enjoin its surrender to the Govern-
ment. Plaintiff contended that he was entitled to equity because
with whatever money damages he might receive at law the alleged un-
constitutional statute and executive order would prevent him from
the purchase of gold bullion. Upon analysis of the complaint in terms
of trover and detinue the court concluded that the plaintiff's "owner-
ship with right of possession is not dependent upon the federal law
or Constitution," and that the plaintiff's complaint was guilty of
anticipating a federal question. The federal right could not be asserted
60. 327 U.S. 678, 66 Sup. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).
61. 228 U.S. 22, 33 Sup. Ct. 410, 57 L. Ed. 716 (1913).
62. Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. 652, 50 L. Ed. 1046 (1906);
Marshall v. Desert Properties Co., 103 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 308 U.S.
563 (1939).
63. 280 U.S. 500, 50 Sup. Ct. 186, 74 L. Ed. 578 (1930).
64. 71 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1934).
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until the reply to the defendant's answer. Therefore there was no
jurisdiction. The court reached this result despite the fact that the
federal substantive right alleged was "essential" for the plaintiff
to show a right to equity °0
Thus the basic test established by the early cases between 1875 and
1888-that there must be a federal substantive right actually in issue
upon which the decision of the whole case depends-has had super-
imposed upon it two further restrictions: (1) only substantive federal
rights of the plaintiff will be considered; and (2) even the plaintiff's
federal substantive rights are not to be considered unless they can
be set forth as essential allegations of his initial pleading, which is
to be analyzed in terms of common law and early equity forms of
action. There is a third restriction discussed in the first section of
this paper, as to whether the issue can be only an issue of law, or
either an issue of law or fact. Thus the present rule is summarized by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian:
(1) "To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and
an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."
(2) "The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if
the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construc-
tion or effect, and defeated if they receive another."
(3) "A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or con-
jectural one, must exist with reference thereto."
(4) "and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal."
(5) "Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction
insofar as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's cause of action
and anticipates or replies to a probable defense."66
The results in these cases seem to be indefensible upon any rational
basis.67 In each case the whole controversy could have been deter-
mined by a decision on the federal substantive right which was
65. For other cases see Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. 652,
50 L. Ed. 104 (1906); Boston and Montana Consol. Copper and Silver Mining
Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 23 Sup. Ct. 434, 47 L. Ed. 626
(1903); Lancaster v. Kathleen Oil Co. 241 U.S. 551, 36 Sup. Ct. 711, 60 L. Ed.
1161 (1916); Ter Haar v. Kettleman North Dome Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.
Cal. 1940); Brown v. Stufflebean, 187 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1951); City of Monroe
v. Detroit, M. & T. S. L. ly., 257 Fed. 782 (E.D. Mich. 1919) with which compare
Columbus By., P. & L. Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349, 63 L.
Ed. 669 (1919). See 2 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE 396, 404-05 (1948); Note, 12
A.L.R.2d 5, 41-67 (1950) and cases there cited.
66. 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 Sup. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936).
67. When it is remembered that the principle of these cases was initiated
by the Metcalf case in 1888 at a turbulent time in the history of the Supreme
Court, when the justices were supposed to ride circuit and were unable to
do so because of the back-log of cases on the Supreme Court docket; at a
time before the establishment of nine intermediate appellate courts to serve
as courts of last resort for righting litigants' wrongs, so that the Supreme
Court could limit itself to questions of national judicial policy and principle;
and at a time when it was realized that the effect of Ex Parte Schollenberger,
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actually put in issue by the time the pleadings and pre-trial proce-
dures were completed. I cannot agree with those who feel that the
present rule, with issues of fact clearly permissible, "seems quite
plainly the correct solution and one that would be happily adopted
by statute."'8 s This conclusion assumes only two alternatives. On the
one hand is the present rule with its "vacillation"' 9 among remedies
and pleading requirements; and on the other hand a construction
of the statute in equal scope to the broad constitutional concept in
which the federal law may constitute only a remote ingredient.30
Neither extreme is a necessary or a desirable alternative. It would
seem perfectly feasible to have the jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts parallel the appellate review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over state court decisions, with appropriate regard for the functional
difference between trial courts and appellate courts concerning issues
of fact. In both instances jurisdiction would exist only if a federal
substantive right was actually in issue and the outcome of the case
depended upon its determination. A general allegation in the plain-
tiff's complaint, similar to that used in diversity cases, that a federal
substantive right is a controlling issue in the case, could suffice until
the pre-trial procedure has progressed to the point where such an
issue could be ascertained, or the case disposed of accordingly.
96 U.S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1877), and the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115
U.S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113, 29 L. Ed. 319 (1885), was to allow corporate business
interests the privilege of removing all of their litigation of the requisite
jurisdictional amount to the federal trial courts even though no federal rights
or issues were involved, the desire to narrow the jurisdiction is at least under-
standable. But this is "justification!' on no higher principle than self-interest;
and it seems unfortunate that the effort for such trivial relief was aimed at
what should be the primary area of federal trial court jurisdiction. See
FRANKFURTER AmD LANDIS, THE Busmmqss OF THE SUPREME COURT 56-103 (1928);
cf. Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COL. L. Ruv. 489,
512 (1954).
68. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and The Revision of The Judicial Code,
13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225 (1948). While Professor Wechsler recog-
nizes that the present rule on removal is "anomalous," he would prefer to
see the right of removal in federal right cases completely eliminated, leaving
the present rule, with fact issues, applicable only where the case is filed
originally in the federal court.
See also, Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL.
L. REv. 157, 168 (1953). "ITlhe criterion for original federal jurisdiction-a
substantial claim founded 'directly' upon federal law-was not arrived at by
explicit consideration of various available tests and the probabilities of each
yielding a high percentage of questions of national interest and a meager
proportion of actions turning upon state law. Nevertheless, it serves as a
fairly good discriminator. Eliminated by it are cases which, because of the
remoteness of the federal element. . . ." [Italics supplied]. But compare his
discussion of the problem here emphasized in Id. at 176-84.
69. Wechsler, supra note 68 at 225.
70. "Needless to say, Congress has not meant to grant the district courts
a general jurisdiction in every case involving the jurisdictional amount in
.which it could confer judicial power under any of its sources of authority.
That would have brought to federal adjudication all cases in the western
states involving devolution of public lands." Wechsler, supra note 68 at 225,
citing Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90
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* There is nothing in either the Constitution or the statute 1 which
compels the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the court must be
determined finally from the plaintiff's complaint. The Supreme Court
has recognized in several diversity cases that jurisdiction of the subject
matter may be ascertained and perfected after the action is com-
menced. 72 The appellate review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
federal right cases decided by state courts is not limited to only the
federal rights of the plaintiff. The entire record is looked to. The
type of thinking which reasons that the assignment of error or peti-
tion for certiorari is the complaint in the Supreme Court and that
therefore in the parallel case of trial court jurisdiction "A court
must either have jurisdiction or not have it from the beginning of
the case, and cannot gain or lose it as the trial progresses," 3 is simply
an example of antiquated common law pleading used as a basis for
determining the distribution of judicial power in twentieth century
American federalism.
This is not to say that the dockets of federal trial courts should be
turned into "a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under
State law."74 At the outset it should be recognized that the Gully
case7 5 and many of the other leading cases which have gone far to
establish the present narrow rule of statutory construction were
cases in which there was actually no federal substantive right in
issue which would have controlled the outcome of the case.76 These
cases are different from Metcalf, Union and Planters' Bank, Mottley
and the other cases discussed above in which it clearly appears that
U. OF PA. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1948). See also
Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TuLANE L. REv. 362 (1942);
Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TuLANE L. Rsv.
263 (1943).
71. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1949).
72. Conolly v. Taylor, 2 Pet. 556, 7 L. Ed. 518 (U.S. 1829); Gordon v. Third
National Bank, 144 U.S. 97, 103, 12 Sup. Ct. 657, 36 L. Ed. 360 (1892); Sun
Printing and Publishing Ass'n. v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 382, 24 Sup. Ct. 696,
48 L. Ed. 1027 (1904). And see Drurrright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1927). See Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction,
49 MIcH. L. REv. 73, 76-77 (1950).
73. See e.g. BuNN, JURISDIcTION AND PRAcTIcE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 26-30, 55 (5th ed.-1949); Moons, COmMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CODE 143 (1949).
74. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
339 U.S. 667, 673, 70 Sup. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
75. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 57 Sup. Ct.
96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936).
76. Arkansas v. Kansas and Texas Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185, 22 Sup. Ct. 47,
46 L. Ed. 144 (1901); Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U.S. 184, 24 Sup.
Ct. 63, 48 L. Ed. 140 (1903); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 26 Sup. Ct. 478,
50 L. Ed. 776 (1906); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 228 U.S. 476, 53 Sup. Ct.
447, 77 L. Ed. 903 (1933).
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the outcome of the case depends solely upon an issue concerning a
federal substantive right. It is true that under the doctrine of The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co. 77 and Bell v. Hood s if a party
alleges a federal substantive right in good faith, jurisdiction exists
no matter how wrong he is on the merits. But then there are true
federal issues, and they are what federal courts should decide. No
doubt, in the past parties have made sham assertions of federal rights,7 0
but these can certainly be disposed of today after the pleadings are
in and before trial by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment.
In addition there is developing what seems to be a sensible modifica-
tion of the Hum v. Ousler" doctrine to the effect that where the dis-
trict court decides on the pleadings that there is no substantive merit
to an alleged federal right, it may in its discretion decline to exercise
jurisdiction in the pendant state law claims."' This will go far to place
the "good faith allegation" doctrine of Bell v. Hood in proper per-
spective and yet preserve federal trial courts for the decision of
federal rights issues.
Also, in recent years the Supreme Court has developed the new
principle that even where there is admitted jurisdiction, a federal
court may, indeed should, exercise self-restraint and stay further
proceedings in deference to an action to be commenced in the state
court where a decision on a point of undetermined state law may
make the determination of the federal issue unnecessary; 2 or even
where the federal issues are so affected by local circumstances that
convenience dictates a deference of the entire matter to the state
court.8 3 This is a very different thing from a decision that no juris-
diction exists at all. Techniques of intergovernmental cooperation have
been used appropriately in other fields, 4 and with a little imagination
can be used effectively so as to preserve state courts for the determina-
77. 228 U.S. 22, 33 Sup. Ct. 410, 57 L. Ed. 716 (1931).
78. 327 U.S. 678, 66 Sup. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).
79. See note 76 supra.
80. 289 U.S. 238, 53 Sup. Ct. 586, 77 L. Ed. 1148 (1933).
81. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth and Rogers Co.,
183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950), 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 450 (1951); 29 TEnxs L.
REV. 547 (1951). See also, Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949);
Fitzhenry v. Erie R.R., 7 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
82. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 Sup.
Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321, 70 Sup. Ct.
640, 94 L. Ed. 877 (1950) and see Learned Hand in Mottolese v. Kaufman,
176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949).
83. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 Sup. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 71 Sup.
Ct. 762, 95 L. Ed. 1002 (1951). See Comments, 19 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 361 (1952);
7 id. 727 (1940).
84. See Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation under the Constitution, 36
MICH. L. REv. 752 (1938); CLAm, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM (1938); Note,
Supreme Court Interpretations of Federal Law Incorporated by Reference,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1498 (1953).
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tion of state law issues and federal courts for the determination of
those cases which depend predominantly upon the vindication of
federal substantive rights.8 5
III.
JuRIsDIcTIoN AND THE DECLARATORY REmEDY
Because the present rule narrowly restricts general federal right
jurisdiction to those comparatively few cases where the federal
substantive right can be fitted in as an essential allegation in a
plaintiff's "well-pleaded" complaint, analyzed in terms of the law of
remedies and anticipatory pleading, it has been seriously questioned
whether such jurisdiction will include actions for a declaratory judg-
ment in cases where the court would not have had jurisdiction if one
of the older common law or early equity remedies had been used by
the plaintiff.80
Historically an outgrowth of such equitable remedies as the bill
quia timet to quiet a title or remove a cloud, the action for a declara-
tory judgment is a twentieth century remedy intended to permit the
plaintiff to obtain an authoritative judicial statement of the legal
relationship existing between the parties to a justiciable case or
controversy within the judicial power of the United States. Since the
complaint must allege facts showing a justiciable controversy, this
is generally accomplished by alleging either that the plaintiff's rights
have been invaded, or are about to be invaded by the defendant, and
then alleging the plaintiff's contentions and the defendant's conten-
tions. The prayer is for a judgment of declaration or determination
of the rights of the parties; it does not seek coercive relief.87 Thus
the pleading rules of this new remedy require the plaintiff to present
in his initial pleading the actual issues in the case. Perhaps the most
striking features of the declaratory remedy are that either party to
a controversy is allowed to bring a suit as "plaintiff," and his com-
plaint may set forth as essential allegations that which would be
considered anticipatory under formalistic common law pleading. Be-
cause of this a complaint for a declaratory judgment may show on
its face that the declaratory plaintiff claims a federal substantive
right or immunity which under common law pleading could not be
alleged until the answer or reply.
85. Cf. Comment, Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction: Convenience or Neces-
sity? 19 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 361 (1952).
86. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 Sup. Ct. 876,
94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950). See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 COL. L. REV. 157, 177-84 (1953); Notes, 4 VAND. L. REv. 827 (1951);
29 N.C.L. REV. 173 (1951); 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89 (1951).
87. Ter Haar v. Kettleman North Dome Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal.
1940); 3 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 1606-07 (2d ed.
1951); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 25 (2d ed. 1941).
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If this remedy could have been used in Metcalf, Union and Planters'
Bank, Mottley, and other cases discussed above in which a federal
substantive right was admittedly the determinative issue, would there
have been jurisdiction? While the Supreme Court has made clear
that the Constitution "did not crystallize into changeless form the
procedure of 1789 as the only possible means for presenting a case or
controversy,"88 did Congress intend to crystallize it in defining by
statute the general federal right jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts? "[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is pro-
cedural only" 89 in the sense that it did not enlarge the scope of the
judicial power authorized by the Constitution. But when "Congress
enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts,"90 did
it not necessarily affect the general federal right jurisdiction of the
federal trial courts under the present rule? While the Declaratory
Judgment Act was clearly not intended to enlarge the jurisdiction
of the federal courts,91 if jurisdiction is to be defined in terms of
the essential allegations in pleading different remedies, will not the
new declaratory remedy by definition affect jurisdiction?
Soon after the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act it was
clearly established that the concept of anticipatory pleading meas-
ured by the earlier common-law remedies would have no application
in diversity cases.92 Insurance companies were allowed to initiate
the action in the federal trial courts to vindicate their state-created
rights and immunities even though they could not have done so by
the earlier remedies. The "character . . . of the issue to be deter-
mined"'9 3 was the controlling factor in upholding jurisdiction.
Also in controversies over federally created rights and privileges
under the patent laws it was soon established that the alleged in-
fringer could initiate the declaratory remedy procedure to establish
that his product did not infringe the defendant's patent.9 4 Prior to
88. Nashville, Chatt. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264, 53 Sup. Ct.
345, 77 L. Ed. 730, 87 A.L.R. 1191 (1933); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000 (1937).
89. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v Haworth, supra note 86, at 240.
90. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 Sup. Ct.
876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
91. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (1950); See 48 STAT. 955 and 49 STAT. 1027. The
statute itself says, "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction."
92. See e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v, Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461,
81 L. Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000 (1937).
93. Id. at 244. [Italics supplied].
94. E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941); Measure-
ment Corp. v. Ferris Instrument Corp., 159 F.2d 590 (3d cir. 1947). See also
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 Sup.
Ct. 416, 91 L. Ed. 374 (1947); Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560,
69 Sup. Ct. 269, 93 L. Ed. 235 (1949). See Notes, 4 V=uD. L. REv. 827 (1951) and




the Declaratory Judgment Act the owner of a patent could enlarge
the scope of his monopoly by harassing his competitors and their
customers with threats of suits for infringement, while studiously
avoiding and delaying a court test. Circulation of these threats among
the trade could be ruinous to the competitor. The only check de-
veloped against this practice had been a suit by the alleged infringer
for an injunction against unfair competition, an unsatisfactory com-
mon-law remedy because of the difficulty of proving that the patentee
had been acting in bad faith.9 5 But since the Declaratory Judgment
Act the lower federal courts have consistently allowed the alleged
infringer to bring suit for a declaration of either non-infringement
or invalidity.95 In the leading case the court said:
"But the controversy between the parties as to whether a patent is valid,
and whether infringement exists is in either instance essentially one
arising under the patent laws of the United States. It is of no moment,
in the determination of the character of the relief sought, that the suit
is brought by the alleged infringer instead of by the owner."
97
In a few other cases where an issue of federal substantive right
was determinative of the whole case the lower federal courts took
jurisdiction under the general federal right statute of actions for a
declaratory judgment where such jurisdiction could not have been
maintained under the present rule by one of the earlier coercive
remedies.98
But in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum CoY9 the Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter went far to say that in actions for
a declaratory judgment the federal right jurisdiction of the district
courts would be determined by the pleading rules of the older com-
95. American Well Works Co. v. Lane and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 36
Sup. Ct. 585, 60 L. Ed. 987 (1916); Alliance Securities Co. v. De Vilbiss Mfg.
Co., 41 F.2d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 1930); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779,
782 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The alleged infringer in a declaratory action however is
not required to prove bad faith. Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d
702 (3d Cir. 1941). See Note, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 837 n. 62 (1951); 62 HAZv.
L. R v. 787, 863 (1949).
96. See cases in note 94 supra. In at least two instances the Supreme Court
has passed on the merits of an action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity
or non-infringement without questioning the jurisdiction. Edward Katzinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg., 329 U.S. 394, 67 Sup. Ct. 416, 91 L. Ed. 374 (1947);
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 69 Sup. Ct. 269, 93 L. Ed.
235 (1949).
97. E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
98. Ter Haar v. Kettleman North Dome Ass'n., 34 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal.
1940); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945); Zaconick v. City
of Hollywood, 85 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Fla. 1949). Quare, Regents of New Mexico
College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1947).
While it is believed that this case should have been dismissed because no
federal substantive right existed, the court held otherwise and took juris-
diction.
99. 339 U.S. 667, 70 Sup. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
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mon-law and early equity forms of actions; that even when the
essential allegations in a complaint for a declaratory remedy show
a federal substantive right in issue, jurisdiction will nevertheless
not exist unless it would have existed under one of the old remedies.
This reasoning was unnecessary to the desired disposition of the
jurisdiction problem in the case. Like the Gully case and many of
the other leading cases which have gone far to obfuscate the early
basic test, the Skelly case does not involve a federal substantive
right at all. It is a contract which simply incorporates by reference
the action of a federal commission. This poses a problem in contract
interpretation; clearly it is not a federally created substantive right.1'0
In the Skelly case, Phillips as buyer contracted with Skelly as
seller for the purchase of natural gas for resale to a pipe line com-
pany. The contract provided that if the pipe line company should fail
to secure a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Federal
Power Commission as required by the Natural Gas Act on or before
October 1, 1946, Seller should have the right to terminate the contract
by written notice to Buyer delivered any time after December 1,
1946, but before the issuance of such certificate. As the Court said,
"The legal significance of this provision is at the core of this litiga-
tion."''1 1 On November 30, 1946, the Federal Power Commission issued
a certificate to the pipe line company, but it was upon certain specified
terms and conditions to be later accomplished by the pipe line com-
pany. On December 2, 1946, Skelly as seller gave notice to Phillips of
the termination of the contract, taking the position that by the terms
of the contract it had the right to terminate since the pipe line com-
pany had not as yet received a certificate as required in the contract.
Phillips thereupon brought suit for a declaratory judgment alleging
that a certificate "within the meaning of said Natural Gas Act and
said contracts" had been issued prior to Skelly's notice of termina-
tion. Since there was no diversity, jurisdiction had to be based upon
the claim of a federal right. The District Court assumed jurisdiction
and decided on the merits that the contract had not been terminated.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the primary ques-
tion was whether the order of the Federal Power Commission "con-
stituted a certificate of convenience and necessity . . . within the
100. Cf. cases where state statutes have incorporated by reference a pro-
vision in a federal law. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S.
481, 62 Sup. Ct. 1168, 86 L. Ed. 1611 (1942); State Tax Commission v. Van
Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 59 Sup. Ct. 605, 83 L. Ed. 950 (1939); Flournoy v. Wiener,
321 U.S. 253, 64 Sup. Ct. 548, 88 L. Ed. 708 (1944). See the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Flournoy case in favor of federal appellate
review jurisdiction over state courts in such cases because of the decision in
the Standard Oil case. See Note, Supreme Court Review of State Interpreta-
tions of Federal Law Incorporated by Reference, 66 HAIv. L. Rav. 1498 (1953).
101. 339 U.S. 667, 669, 70 Sup. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950).
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requirements of the Act."'12 The Court of Appeals said that it was
"not an action to enforce or to construe the contracts."'103 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari "because it raises in sharp form the question
whether a suit like this 'arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States,' 28 U.S.C. § 1331, so as to enable District
Courts to give declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment
Act." 0 4
In reversing the lower courts and properly directing that the part
of the case here discussed should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court did not seem to consider whether a federal sub-
stantive right was involved.'0 5 The Court did say that jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts "means the kinds of issues which give right
of entrance to federal courts," but then it forsook that true principle
of jurisdiction and dwelt at length upon the spurious principle of
determining jurisdiction by the pleading requirements of older
remedies:
"If Phillips sought damages from petitioners or specific performance of
their contracts, it could not bring suit in a United States District Court
on the theory that it was asserting a federal right.... Whatever federal
claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be injected into
the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by petitioners."' 06
The Court then comes down through cases from Metcalf through
Union and Planters' Bank and Mottley to Gully to show that where
a federal right is not an essential allegation of the plaintiff's com-
plaint but only an anticipatory allegation, there is no jurisdiction:
"To be observant of these restrictions is not to indulge in formalism or
sterile technicality. It would turn into the federal courts a vast current
of litigation indubitably arising under State law, in the sense that the
right to be vindicated was State-created, if a suit for a declaration of
rights could be brought into the federal courts merely because an antici-
pated defense derived from federal law." 07
If a federal substantive right is not involved in the case, it is
difficult to see how even anticipatory pleading would make it so.
But of more serious importance is the suggestion that the essential
102. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 174 F.2d 89, 97 (10th Cir. 1949).
103. Ibid.
104. 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
105. As to other parties in the case there was diversity of citizenship. In
dealing with the merits as to these parties the Court clearly indicates that a
state created contract right was involved. "Even though the language of the
contract may be identic with that of § 7(c) [of the Natural Gas Act], this
language in the contract may have a scope independent of the proper con-
struction of § 7 (c). The same words, in different settings, may not mean the
same thing." Id. at 678.
106. Id. at 672.
107. Id. at 673.
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allegations of a complaint for a declaratory judgment will not be
counted in determining the federal right jurisdiction of the federal
trial courts. This seems unnecessary and unfortunate in an area
of the law which already is unnecessarily complex. If there is to be
discrimination between plaintiffs and defendants, and discrimination
between essential allegations and anticipatory allegations measured
by the differences in the old remedies, must there now be discrimina-
tion against even the essential allegations of a new remedy? If
jurisdiction is to be measured by the essential allegations in pleading
different remedies, it would seem that whenever a federal sub-
stantive right appears properly pleaded in a complaint for a declara-
tory judgment, there should be jurisdiction.
If this is not true, then federal right jurisdiction in declaratory
actions must be determined in terms of the essential pleading require-
ments in the older forms of action. This will require analysis in
terms of each of the older remedies that might be available to either
of the parties, as well as the pleading requirements in each instance.
Indeed, as indicated by the patent cases, in some instances the declara-
tory plaintiff could not be a plaintiff in one of the older remedies
and still litigate the precise issue which he needs to have determined. 0 8
This can lead only to further obfuscation and uncertainty °9 in an
area which should be and can be made relatively clear and certain.
IV.
A PROPOSAL FOR RsF'om
It is the thesis of this paper that the basic principle established
by the early cases" 0 which construed the Act of 1875 between that
date and the Metcalf case in 1888 is a desirable principle and a feasible
one for defining the federal right jurisdiction of the district courts.
That principle was essentially that jurisdiction would exist if there
was a federal substantive right actually in issue in the case and if
108. See cases cited in notes 94-96 supra. Also, Zaconick v. City of Holly-
wood, 85 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
For cases since the Skelly case in which the federal district courts have
assumed jurisdiction in declaratory actions by the alleged infringer of a
patent, see Alamo Refining Co. v. Shell Development Co., 99 F. Supp. 790
(D. Del. 1951); Kobre v. Photoral Corp., 100 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
109. See e.g., 3 VA=w. L. REv. 320 (1950); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 802-03
(1949). The Harvard Law Review Note, which was cited with apparent ap-
proval in the majority Skelly opinion, suggests three possible views of the
jurisdictional effect of the Declaratory Judgment Act; (1) that jurisdiction
exists if the federal question is properly set forth in the complaint, even
though the question would have arisen only as a defense, reply, or otherwise
in a coercive action between the same parties; (2) that jurisdiction exists
only if it would exist in a coercive action by this particular plaintiff against
this defendant; and (3) that jurisdiction exists if, it would exist in a coercive
action by either party against the other. The Note, referring to the patent
cases, recommends adoption of the third view.
110. See notes 29 to 34 supra.
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the outcome of the whole case would be controlled by the decision
on this federal issue. This is essentially the test of the parallel juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to exercise appellate review over state
court decisions, with appropriate allowances for functional differ-
ences. "[J]urisdiction," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "means the
kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts.""'
Whether or not federal issues control the decision in the case should
not be determined solely from the plaintiff's complaint. It can be
determined at any time during the pre-trial procedure when the
controlling issues are made to appear. While normally such issues
will appear when the answer is filed, they may not do so until a
reply is filed, and in many cases a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment will better serve to identify them.
It is believed that if this test is applied, the federal courts will
not be turned into "a vast current of litigation indubitably arising
under State law." Instead the emphasis will properly be upon the
identification of those federal issues which control the outcome of
the case, rather than on the rules of pleading and forms of action.
Without a doubt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with one
motion to dismiss including as grounds both lack of jurisdiction and
lack of merit," 2 and the motion for summary judgment,13 as well
as deposition-discovery, pre-trial conference and other procedures,
provide much more efficient and flexible tools for sifting the actual
issues in the case than the procedures in vogue at the time of Metcalf
and Union and Planters' Bank in 1888-1894.
To so define jurisdiction will remove at least a part of the judicial
paradox in American federalism. It would allow the federal district
courts to take jurisdiction in those cases having the requisite juris-
dictional amount"14 in which the outcome is controlled wholly by
federal issues. On the other hand cases like Skelly, Gully, and oth-
ers"15 which have gone far to stress the anticipatory pleading phase
of the present rule of jurisdiction will still be excluded, because
analysis will disclose that there is no issue concerning a right created
by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States which will
control the outcome of the case.
This will also to some extent relieve state court judges of the
burden of deciding what are often new and novel questions of federal
law. It is believed that frequently under the present rule there is
111. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, supra note 102 at page 671.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 12b.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
114. Professor Wechsler has sensibly suggested that there should be no
jurisdictional amount in general federal right cases. Wechsler, Federal Juris-
diction and The Revision of The Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CO=rMP. PROB.
216, 225 (1948.
115. See note 76 supra.
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embarrassment and resentment when the Supreme Court of the United
States reverses the Supreme Court of a State upon a federal issue
which is new, equivocal, and not at all dependent upon State law.
State court judges ought not to be subjected to such career hazards.
In the expanding economy of the twentieth century the state courts
are busy with state litigation as well as those federal specialties which
Congress has expressly required them to adjudicate. 10 Since general
federal right jurisdiction is so frequently called into play in the more
unusual cases-e.g., human rights cases or cases involving individual
economic interests as distinguished from industry or large group in-
terests-it does not seem to be a sound policy which requires such
federal rights to be initially vindicated in state courts. It would seem
that federal courts should specialize in federal law and federal rights
and be available to determine cases in which the outcome will be
controlled by issues about federal rights. This would seem to be a
more rational distribution of judicial power between state courts
and federal courts.
Since it is the Congress which has the responsibility under the
Constitution, it is believed that legislation clarifying the general
federal right jurisdiction of the district courts should be enacted. Two
proposals for reform have been published previously. In one," 7 the
jurisdiction of the district court would seem to be limited to issues
of law. This seems inconsistent with the inherent function of trial
courts to determine whole cases. In the other," s the identical language
of the Constitution is retained in the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
The substantial difference in function between the Constitution and
the statute makes this seem undesirable. Without taking sides in the
differing opinionsw 9 about what Congress intended by the Act of
1875, it is believed that clarification could be achieved by the follow-
ing proposal.
Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to read as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions [wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $3,000, exclusive of interest and Costs,]120 in which there is an
issue of law or fact concerning a right created by the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States, and the determination of such
issue will control the outcome of the case.
(b) Whether or not there is such an issue in the case may be deter-
mined by the district court from all the pleadings and papers filed in
116. See e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 Sup. Ct. 810, 91 L. Ed. 967,
172 A.L.R. 225 (1947).
117. See Comment, Proposed Revision of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
40 ILL. L. REV. 387, 396-403 (1945).
118. Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MicH. L.
REv. 73, 89 (1950).
119. See articles in note 6 supra.
120. See note 114 supra.
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the case, and such determination of jurisdiction may be made at any
time during the pendency of the case.
(c) If prior to the trial of the case the district court should decide
that the federal right asserted is without substantive merit, the court
may in its discretion dismiss without prejudice pendant claims for
relief based upon state created rights.
Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to read as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action [wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs,] brought in a State
court in which there is an issue of law or fact concerning a right
created by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States may
be removed by either party 21 to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending, if the determination of such issue will control the outcome
of the case.
(b) Any other civil action filed in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed
by the defendant or defendants to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.
121. Subsection (a) of Section 1446 could be amended by substituting the
phrase "party or parties" for the phrase "defendant or defendants." See
Fraser, supra note 117.
Subsection (b) of section 1446 could be amended to read: "The petition
for removal of a civil action as described in Section 1441(a) must be filed
within ........ days after receipt by the moving party through service or
otherwise of a copy of the pleading, motion, order or other paper from which
it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become re-
movable."
"The petition for removal of a civil action as described in Section 1441 (b)
shall be filed within twenty days after the receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim
for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within twenty
days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant,
whichever period is shorter. If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a petition for removal may be filed within twenty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable."
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